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Abstract 
 
The current stage of development of the entire 
world community, including Russia, is associated 
with such a thing as “sanction wars”. As an 
example, one can recall the introduction of US 
sanctions against China, Iran, Venezuela, and 
other countries, European sanctions, as well as 
various countersanctions of countries subjected to 
sanction pressure. 
As part of this paper, the sanctions imposed 
against Russia in connection with the Ukrainian 
crisis in 2014 and countersanctions imposed by 
Russia are considered. The purpose of this study 
is to identify the impact of sanctions and 
countersanctions on the national security of 
Russia. In this regard, the following tasks were 
set: to identify the list of sanctions of Western 
countries imposed against Russia and their 
impact on the national security of Russia, to 
identify the list of countersanctions of Russia 
against Western countries and their impact on the 
national security of Russia, to identify further 
actions of Russia to ensure the national security 
of Russia under the conditions of sanction 
pressure. 
The study is based on the dialectical, historical 
and systematic approach, analysis, synthesis and 
comparison, induction and deduction. The study 
analyzed Russian and international literature on 
  Анотація 
 
современный этап развития всего мирового 
сообщества, в том числе России, связан с 
таким явлением как «санкционные войны», в 
качестве примера можно вспомнить введение 
санкции США против Китая, Ирана, 
Венесуэлы и других стран, европейские 
санкции, а также различные контрсанкции 
стран, подвергшихся санкционному 
давлению. 
В рамках данной статьи рассмотрены 
санкции, введенные против России в связи с 
украинским кризисом в 2014 году, и 
контрсанкции введенные Россией. Целью 
данного исследования является определение 
влияния санкций и контрсанкций на 
национальную безопасность России. В этой 
связи были поставлены следующие задачи: 
определить перечень санкции западных 
стран, введенных против России, и их 
влияние на национальную безопасность 
России, определить перечень контрсанкций 
России против западных стран и их влияние 
на национальную безопасность России, 
определить дальнейшее действия России по 
обеспечению национальной безопасности 
России в условиях санкционного давления. 
Исследование основано на диалектическом, 
историческом и системном подходе, анализе, 
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the topic of sanctions and their impact on national 
security. 
Based on the results of the study, the directions of 
economic development based on the promotion 
of import substitution, innovation and public-
private partnerships with the aim of ensuring the 
national security of Russia under the conditions 
of sanction pressure have been proposed. The 
findings of the study may be of interest to the 
academic community, studying the impact of 
sanctions on the national security of the country. 
The experience of Russia may be of interest to 
countries subjected to sanction pressure from the 
United States and its allies. 
 
Keywords: Sanctions, embargo, national 
security, import substitution, innovation, public-
private partnership. 
 
синтезе и сравнении, индукции и дедукции. В 
исследовании проанализирована российская 
и международная литература на тему санкций 
и их влияния на национальную безопасность. 
По итогам исследования предложены 
направления экономического развития, 
основанные на стимулировании 
импортозамещения, инноваций и 
государственно-частного партнерства с 
целью обеспечения национальной 
безопасности России в условиях 
санкционного давления. Выводы, 
полученные в ходе исследования, могут быть 
интересны научному сообществу, изучающие 
влияние санкций на национальную 
безопасность страны, опыт России может 
быть интересен странам, подвергшимся 
санкционному давлению США и их 
союзников. 
 
Ключевые слова: санкции, эмбарго, 
национальная безопасность, 
импортозамещение, инновации, 
государственно-частное партнерство. 
 
Resumen 
 
La etapa actual de desarrollo de toda la comunidad mundial, incluida Rusia, está asociada con cosas como 
"guerras de sanciones", por ejemplo, podemos recordar la introducción de sanciones de Estados Unidos 
contra China, Irán, Venezuela y otros países, sanciones europeas, así como varios países. sometido a presión 
de sanción. 
Como parte de este artículo, se consideran las sanciones impuestas contra Rusia en relación con la crisis 
ucraniana en 2014 y las sanciones contrarias impuestas por Rusia. El propósito de este estudio es determinar 
el impacto de las sanciones y contra-sanciones en la seguridad nacional de Rusia. En este sentido, se 
establecieron las siguientes tareas: determinar la lista de sanciones de los países occidentales impuestas 
contra Rusia, y su impacto en la seguridad nacional de Rusia, determinar la lista de contra-sanciones de 
Rusia contra los países occidentales y su impacto en la seguridad nacional de Rusia, para determinar 
acciones adicionales de Rusia para garantizar la seguridad nacional de Rusia bajo condiciones de presión 
de sanción. 
El estudio se basa en un enfoque dialéctico, histórico y sistemático, análisis, síntesis y comparación, 
inducción y deducción. El estudio analizó la literatura rusa e internacional sobre el tema de las sanciones y 
su impacto en la seguridad nacional. 
Sobre la base de los resultados del estudio, se proponen las direcciones del desarrollo económico basadas 
en la promoción de la sustitución de importaciones, la innovación y las asociaciones público-privadas con 
el objetivo de garantizar la seguridad nacional de Rusia en condiciones de presión de sanción. Los hallazgos 
del estudio pueden ser de interés para la comunidad científica, al estudiar el impacto de las sanciones en la 
seguridad nacional del país, la experiencia de Rusia puede ser de interés para los países sujetos a la presión 
de las sanciones de los Estados Unidos y sus aliados. 
 
Palabras clave: Sanciones, embargo, seguridad nacional, sustitución de importaciones, innovación, 
asociación público-privada. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The dynamics of modern international relations 
makes one look differently at the processes of 
modernization and globalization, which are a  
 
means of introducing universal standards of 
economic, political and social relations between 
different countries. That is why the interpretation 
Ovcharenko, R., Goncharova, O., Kondratenko, E., Trofimov, G., Glushchenko, A. /Vol. 8 Núm. 22: 565 - 573/ 
Septiembre - octubre 2019 
                                   Vol. 8 Núm. 22/Septiembre - octubre 2019 
 
                                                                                                                                           
 
567 
Encuentre este artículo en http://www.udla.edu.co/revistas/index.php/amazonia -investiga o www.amazoniainvestiga.info                
ISSN 2322- 6307 
of globalization as a process of spreading 
universal world values is being transformed into 
a process that provokes the expansion of the 
environment of risks and threats to national 
security from the local to the global level. It is 
obvious that the situation that has developed on 
the international scene as a result of the 
application of economic sanctions against the 
Russian Federation by the countries of the 
European Union and the USA is the reason for 
the growing interest in ensuring the country’s 
national security. 
 
The modern era is characterized by new priorities 
and challenges, as well as new approaches to 
solving the problems facing Russia and other 
countries. The relevance and need for the 
transition of the domestic economy to the post-
industrial stage of development are considered 
the most important problem that has been 
discussed by economists, political scientists, and 
government officials in recent decades 
(Medvedev, 2015). The events that took place in 
2014, which were characterized by the military 
conflict in Ukraine, a worsening situation in the 
energy market, as well as the imposition of 
various sanctions against Russian enterprises, 
show that Russia’s transition to a new 
technological structure based on innovative 
economic development, and to a new model of 
economic development should be a priority for 
ensuring the national security of Russia. 
 
However, in the academic literature, there are 
various, often diametrically opposing points of 
view regarding the causes of the current crisis 
state in the Russian economy. So, according to 
(Akindinova, Kuzminov and Yasin, 2016), the 
future model of Russia’s economic development 
(in the context of falling energy prices and, 
consequently, the absence of a constant influx of 
oil and gas rents) should focus on the option of 
gradual development based on the advantages of 
a market economy and competition, that is, 
implying the absence of radical changes. At the 
same time, the point of view is more and more 
frequent that without a radical restructuring of 
the economic strategy, Russia will be able to 
survive, but it risks staying long outside the 
world community (Stepanov, 2014), because its 
position in the system of the international 
division of labor as a “supplier of raw materials, 
its dependence on prices for them, submission to 
tight control of global multinationals, signs of 
degradation of the country’s scientific, technical 
and socio-economic development” (Gurieva and 
Baburina, 2012) is a serious threat to national 
security. 
Thus, the Russian economy is undergoing 
profound transformations. In the coming years, 
Russia will have to radically modernize the 
economic system to meet the changes and 
challenges in the global social and economic 
order (Medvedev, 2016). 
 
No less debatable is the set of problems 
associated with assessing the impact of economic 
sanctions on the Russian economy and retaliatory 
measures (countersanctions) on the US and 
European economies. In their most general form, 
sanctions are primarily aimed at changing the 
behavior of an object (as an instrument of 
coercion), limiting its behavior (deterrent effect), 
or transmitting a message to an object (signal 
effect). Theoretically, sanctions were seen as an 
alternative to military force, material gain and 
diplomacy in a situation where “inaction” is not 
an option. As (Veebel and Markus, 2016) note, 
sanctions are “less glamorous than diplomacy, 
and less drastic than war”. 
 
(Afesorgbor, 2019) draws attention to the 
importance of studying the period preceding the 
imposition of sanctions, the impact of the threat 
of sanctions on exporters and importers: the 
longer this period, the lower the effectiveness of 
sanctions ceteris paribus. 
 
After analyzing, (Dong and Li, 2017) showed 
that everyone suffers from the sanctions imposed 
on Russia and its retaliatory measures: Russia, 
the EU countries, the United States, but to 
varying degrees, with the most significant 
damage to Russia. From an economic point of 
view, the optimal choice for the US and the EU 
is, in the author’s opinion, the rejection of 
sanctions against Russia. 
 
Assessing Russia’s damage from sanctions and 
retaliatory measures, IMF experts believe that 
sanctions led to a reduction in economic growth 
by 1-1.5%, while cumulative losses from them 
can reach 9% of the Russian economy 
(Gordienko, 2019). This forecast is 
understandable, because only 60 areas of 
production (more than 248 products and product 
groups, software and technologies) are classified 
as critically dependent on imports in Russia. The 
total domestic market in these areas is almost 2% 
of Russia's GDP (Vartanova and Osadchaya, 
2018). The share of imports in the machine tool 
industry exceeds 90%, in the electronic industry, 
as well as in pharmaceuticals and the medical 
industry – about 80%, in heavy engineering – 
almost 80%, etc. (Goncharova, 2015). The most 
serious consequences, according to forecasts, 
may be the ban on the export of high technology 
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to Russia, as well as a lack of access of Russian 
banks to cheap Western loans. 
 
According to (Gurvich and Prilepskiy, 2016), the 
imposed sanctions against the Russian 
Federation hit many oil, gas, and defense 
enterprises, as well as banks such as Gazprom, 
Almaz-Antey, Sberbank, VTB and many others. 
At the same time, the authors note that sanctions 
indirectly affected enterprises working with these 
banks, especially foreign ones. The total 
economic damage from the imposition of 
sanctions by researchers was estimated at USD 
160-170 billion, and the reduction of foreign 
assets – more than 3.3 times. 
 
However, the effectiveness of sanctions cannot 
be unambiguously assessed only relying on 
forecast data that, by definition, are probabilistic. 
According to (Portansky, 2014), Russia in its 
history has repeatedly experienced the influence 
of Western sanctions: the “sanitary cordon” 
around Soviet Russia in 1920-1930, the 
restrictive list of COCOM (Coordinating 
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) on 
the supply of “strategic” goods and technologies 
to the countries of the “Eastern bloc” in the post-
war period, the American ban on the sale of grain 
of the USSR in 1980, etc. Sanctions were 
repeatedly introduced against other countries, 
including Cuba, Libya, Iraq, Iran, but their 
effectiveness did not exceed, on average, 35%. 
At the same time, during the period of sanctions, 
opportunities for strengthening national security 
open up, for example, China, which, under the 
influence of US sanctions, “managed to develop 
its own policy that ensured tremendous growth of 
the national economy ... became an active 
participant in the global market... while 
maintaining national specificity and sovereignty” 
(Baburina, 2015). A similar task now faces 
Russia – to create its own model of economic 
development with the aim of creating a state that 
is strong economically and independent. 
 
In the framework of this paper, of course, it is 
impossible to cover all aspects of such a model. 
It is advisable to dwell on some aspects of 
development under the conditions of sanctions: 
the transition to an innovative path of 
development and the development of public-
private partnerships (PPPs). 
 
In the academic literature today there is no 
unequivocal opinion either on the issue of the 
impact of economic sanctions and retaliatory 
measures on national security, or on the issue of 
assessing damage to the Russian economy (both 
current and long-term, from their application), or 
regarding the contours of the future model of the 
Russian economy. 
 
Moreover, it is completely obvious that the 
current stage of development is a chance to 
narrow the gap in the levels of economic and 
social development of Russia and developed 
countries, and to create an economically and 
politically independent power. 
 
To achieve these goals, a comprehensive 
approach is needed, a radical change in the state’s 
economic policy, stimulation of innovation and 
public-private partnerships. 
 
The impact of economic sanctions on national 
security in terms of the transition to an innovative 
trajectory and the development of public-private 
partnerships is ambiguous. 
 
The current situation determines the need to 
improve state support for innovation in the 
Russian Federation in order to maintain and 
strengthen national security, as well as make 
adjustments to the state policy of stimulating 
PPP. 
 
However, first of all, it is necessary to form a 
clear idea of the model of the economy, which 
must necessarily replace the raw stock model. It 
is within the framework of this new model that 
one should consider the directions of stimulating 
innovation and public-private partnerships. 
 
Research objective and methodology 
 
The purpose of this study is to identify the impact 
of sanctions and countersanctions on the national 
security of Russia. In this regard, the following 
tasks were set: to identify the list of sanctions of 
Western countries imposed against Russia and 
their impact on the national security of Russia, to 
identify the list of Russian countersanctions 
against Western countries and their impact on the 
national security of Russia, to identify further 
actions of Russia to ensure national security 
under the conditions of sanction pressure. 
 
The study is based on the dialectical, historical 
and systematic approach, analysis, synthesis and 
comparison, induction and deduction. The study 
analyzed Russian and international literature on 
the topic of sanctions and their impact on 
national security. 
 
The study used data from The Global Innovation 
Index 2018, The Global Competitiveness Report 
2018, the National Report on Innovations in 
Russia 2016, reports of the National Association 
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of Innovations and Development of Information 
Technologies, the Federal State Statistics Service 
of Russia. 
 
Results 
 
Sanctions applied to Russia are classified as 
blocking and sectoral. Under blocking sanctions, 
the assets of individuals and companies in both 
the USA and the EU are frozen, and entry into 
the territory of these countries is also prohibited. 
Sectoral sanctions apply to specific individuals 
operating in certain sectors of the economy, as 
well as to companies owned or controlled by 
such individuals. 
 
In the defense sector, persons and companies that 
have fallen under US sanctions have been banned 
from importing and exporting weapons and 
related dual-use products, goods, and services. 
The energy sector has banned the export to 
Russia of goods, services, and technologies 
related to exploration and production of oil on the 
Arctic shelf, deep-sea production, and shale 
projects. For those included in the EU sanctions 
lists, a licensing procedure has been introduced 
for transactions with Russia in relation to goods 
and technologies that are designed for oil and 
mineral extraction. 
 
By mid-March 2018, 422 legal entities were 
under US sanctions from among the key sectors 
of the Russian economy; the number of 
individuals exceeded 400. As of today, this list 
has been supplemented by 38 more Russian 
representatives. A significant problem from the 
application of sanctions was the decline in the 
investment activity of large-scale Russian 
companies such as Gazprom, Lukoil, Novatek 
and Rosneft [Political Internet Portal “Current 
Time”, 2019]. In this connection, the state budget 
expenditures increased in order to support these 
companies; pension accumulations of citizens 
and the National Welfare Fund became the 
compensating financial sources. In view of the 
circumstances, it is understood that the US and 
the EU will not stop the spread of anti-Russian 
sanctions and will expand the list of their allies. 
Using sanctions as a signal for the international 
community can be seen as an instrument of 
“communication war” (Veebel and Markus, 
2016). 
 
In addition, the regime of existing sanctions 
against the Russian Federation is constantly 
being tightened, namely, the maximum term of 
permitted debt obligations has been reduced. The 
new deadlines were 14 days for banks under 
sanctions (previously 30 days) and 60 days for 
energy companies (previously 60 days). The 
restrictions on Russian oil projects in deep-sea, 
offshore Arctic and shale deposits were also 
tightened, setting a maximum threshold for 
Russian organizations to participate at 33% in 
projects where the American side is allowed to 
sell equipment and technologies (Political 
Internet Portal “Current Time”, 2019). 
 
As noted above, Russia responded with a list of 
retaliatory sanctions and embargoes on imports 
of most agricultural products, the country of 
origin of which either decided to impose 
economic sanctions on Russian legal entities and 
(or) individuals, or joined their imposition 
(Castagneto -Gissey and Nivorozhkin, 2016). 
Political issues began to dominate economic 
interests (Mau, 2017). The analysis shows that 
sanctioned opposition between the US, EU, and 
Russia definitely harms all participants, but 
benefits countries not involved in this process 
(Dong and Li, 2017). 
 
In modern conditions, it is especially important 
to consider the impact of sanctions on national 
security in terms of the development of Russian 
innovative potential. Today, according to 
researchers, the share of Russia in the global 
innovation system is less than 1%, which is 
explained by the fact that Russia “dropped out” 
of the world technological race in the 1980s-
1990s (Lebedeva, 2017). 
 
According to the rating of the World Economic 
Forum, the Russian Federation has indicators of 
innovative development much lower than the 
average world level and ranks as follows (in 
2018): the level of innovative potential of the 
country – 36th; the infrastructure support – 51st; 
the business activity of enterprises – 51st place 
(The Global Competitiveness Report, 2018). 
 
In addition, Russia, unfortunately, is far behind 
developed countries in terms of funding research 
and development (R&D), and the share of 
research costs in Russian GDP remains low. In 
the period from 2008 to 2011, there was an 
increase in R&D expenditures in Russia, but 
from 2012 to 2017, this indicator decreases 
annually (Indicators of Innovation in the Russian 
Federation, 2019). 
 
It is worth noting that in the ranking of the Global 
Innovation Index for 2018, which is calculated 
on the basis of the achieved results in the field of 
innovation and available resources for 
innovation, Russia ranked only 46th, which 
indicates a low innovative potential of the 
country. The leaders of this rating are 
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Switzerland and the Netherlands (The Global 
Innovation Index, 2018). 
 
The current economic and political situation in 
Russia, in particular, the imposition of sanctions 
and counter-sanctions, has a twofold effect on the 
innovative sphere of Russia. 
 
On the one hand, there is a stimulating effect of 
sanctions. According to the National Association 
of Innovation and Information Technology 
Development (NAIITD, 2015), in 2014 in Russia 
there was a significant increase in the innovation 
activity of domestic enterprises: the general 
index of innovation activity grew by 18%, the 
number of new startups grew by 15% due to 2.8 
thousand new projects. Moreover, a significant 
part of them, namely 68%, is devoted to the real 
sector of the economy. In industries where there 
was a particular dependence on Western 
technology, significant growth was also noted: 
by 18% in biotechnology, by 17% in 
microelectronics, and by 14% in 
pharmaceuticals. In the field of creating robotics 
and unmanned aerial vehicles, an increase of 
21% was also noted. 
 
On the other hand, NAIITD data indicate that as 
a result of the imposition of sanctions for the first 
half of 2015, the innovation industry in Russia 
lost about USD 50 million in investments. Also, 
a 30% reduction in the financing of innovation 
from the state budget was noted. It can be stated 
that there is a decrease in the share of innovative 
services and goods in the total volume of 
products shipped from 8.9% to 8.2%. The 
proportion of organizations implementing 
technological innovations has decreased. So, if in 
2012 this indicator was at the level of 9.1%, then 
in 2016 it amounted to 8.9% (NAIITD, 2015). 
 
The Gaidar Forum “Russia and the World: A 
Look at the Future” was held in 2016, and the 
“National Report on Innovations in Russia in 
2016” [National Report on Innovations in Russia, 
2016] was presented at this forum. This report 
cited disappointing figures: in the total output of 
innovative products, the share was 8.0% and has 
not increased over the past 3 years, while in the 
leading countries, this indicator is almost 15%. 
The slowdown may be partially due to cyclical 
factors, that is, low investment activity, which is 
reflected in the excess of savings over 
investments, which is typical for most developed 
countries. This period of declining investment is 
apparently associated with a high level of 
uncertainty, which is natural during the 
modernization of technology and the expected 
structural reforms. 
The report also noted that there is low 
competitiveness of Russian innovations – in the 
total world export of high-tech goods, Russia’s 
share does not exceed 0.4%. These values are 
extremely low, even despite the fact that this 
indicator shows positive dynamics – in 2010, the 
share of Russia was 0.21%. In general, it can be 
noted that the Russian economy and its 
innovative component continue to “struggle” 
with inefficiencies in the allocation of production 
factors, ruble devaluation, tightening monetary 
policy, capital flight, reduced investment and 
increased risk perception (Tuzova and Qayum, 
2016). 
 
The sanctions had a mixed effect on the public-
private partnership (PPP) system in Russia. In 
general, in modern conditions, as (Aleinikov, 
2011) rightly remarks, the state needs highly 
developed, civilized, socially responsible 
entrepreneurship, strategically focused on the 
long-term interests of society, while 
entrepreneurial structures “... have reached the 
limit of efficiency within the framework of a 
resource-based export-oriented model and need 
in the institutional transformation of relations 
with the state upon entering new, high-tech and 
science-intensive markets, in reducing 
administrative barriers and investment risks”. 
 
In the context of the sanctions policy of Western 
countries, many foreign companies were forced 
to leave the Russian market, because they were 
facing problems in those countries where their 
head offices were located in the form of closure, 
payment of huge fines and other sanctions. 
Studying the impact of sanctions on the 
economic development of the country, the author 
opines that one of the important ways to improve 
the socio-economic situation in the country can 
be to expand the system of partnerships between 
the state and business – that is, the system of 
public-private partnership. In addition, this 
mechanism is one of the most important for the 
growth and competitiveness of the regions. 
 
It should be noted that the policy of foreign 
companies under the conditions of sanctions is 
more pragmatic than the statements of officials. 
Often there are contradictions between the 
sanctions imposed by foreign states and the 
domestic legislation of the Russian Federation, in 
particular, affecting PPP projects with foreign 
enterprises. So, some foreign sanctions prohibit 
any economic activity in the Republic of Crimea. 
At the same time, the Russian legislation 
prohibits any discrimination of a client. For 
example, on the basis of Article 846 of the Civil 
Code of the Russian Federation, a bank is 
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obligated to conclude a bank account agreement 
with a client who has the opportunity to offer to 
open an account with the bank allocated for 
opening such accounts that fully complies with 
the requirements established by law and banking 
rules. Unilateral refusal of the bank to provide 
services is prohibited. 
 
Therefore, any organization engaged in foreign 
economic activity in Russia within the 
framework of public-private partnership projects 
is obliged to take into account the provisions of 
the Russian law in its activities, which prohibits 
any discrimination against customers, but on the 
other hand, such an organization is in connection 
with the real sanctions regime of the country 
where its parent company is located. This 
example demonstrates the main dilemma that 
most foreign companies, especially credit ones, 
deal with. The data suggest that most of the 
counterparties of foreign companies located in 
the territory of Crimea use the addresses of the 
Krasnodar Territory or Rostov Region to prevent 
the account being blocked. 
 
Sanctions had an extremely negative impact on 
many projects involving foreign companies. For 
example, British Petroleum and Shell completely 
suspended their activities in the framework of the 
construction of the Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 
gas pipelines, because otherwise they would be 
threatened with termination of business not only 
in Russia but also in many other countries of the 
world. 
 
The head of practice on the formation of 
infrastructure projects and public-private 
partnership projects of Herbert Smith Freehills 
Olga Revizina noted that today projects of this 
format that have already been conceived have 
significant difficulties in implementation. The 
expert noted that foreign enterprises that want to 
cooperate with Russia should now look through 
the sanctions lists in advance and choose for 
themselves those companies with which there is 
no prohibition on joint activities. Therefore, the 
first thing that now foreign companies wishing to 
work with a particular company in Russia do is 
finding out from independent legal consultants 
whether their potential partner is subject to 
sanctions. It is possible that those companies 
being already ready to enter the Russian market 
could face restrictions on creating joint ventures 
and abandon this idea (Mereminskaya, 2017). 
 
However, not all projects in the field of public-
private partnerships are completely prohibited. 
For example, only financial restrictions are 
possible. For example, the French construction 
company Vinci and Sberbank have already 
decided to hold a joint event, but one of the 
largest Russian banks got into the sanctions list. 
In general, according to analysts, there are no 
insurmountable barriers to the development of a 
public-private partnership system based on the 
influence of sanctions. To a greater extent, the 
problem is not sanctions. The general expediency 
of using these projects in Russia is gradually 
falling, since many financial organizations of an 
international level, for example, the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, have 
left Russia, and accordingly, there is no way to 
obtain additional financing. In addition, investors 
leave the Russian market because they do not see 
interesting projects. 
 
Conclusions  
 
Most state strategies for the development of 
sectors of the Russian economy until 2020 and 
until 2023 provide for measures to develop 
import substitution (preferences for enterprises 
engaged in modernization, budget investments in 
infrastructure development, tax preferences, 
formulation and implementation of federal 
targeted programs for the development of these 
sectors). 
 
It is necessary to consolidate these measures into 
a single document covering the entire Russian 
economy as a whole and to develop a 
comprehensive program for import substitution 
and simultaneous solving of the problems of 
faster production development based on 
innovative technologies and ensuring national 
security. It is important that this program 
contributes to the creation of new cooperative 
ties, primarily within the framework of the 
EAEU and BRICS, which, ultimately, should 
give an additional impetus to the development of 
the real sector of the Russian economy, reduce 
the severity of the problem of attracting 
investments, ensure the participation of foreign 
companies in large infrastructure and transport 
projects. 
 
It is equally important to study the experience of 
countries that have successfully implemented a 
course towards the development of the economy, 
in particular, China. Today, after many years, 
China is seen as a new economic leader, having 
created its own distinctive and quite effective 
model of economic development. It should be 
based on the fact that the period that Russia is 
going through is a time of opportunities, 
including opportunities to solve the problems of 
overcoming the lag behind developed countries 
in the innovation sphere, as well as the 
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development of public-private partnerships. 
Moreover, these problems, which are currently 
aggravated by the action of economic sanctions, 
will be solved in a rather short time, because in 
the next 10 to 15 years, developed countries will 
begin the transition to the sixth technological 
order, which will open up new opportunities for 
Russia. They should not be missed, since Russia 
in the 1990s was not able to take advantage of the 
transition to the fifth technological mode, as a 
result of which its gap in development level with 
Western countries increased to 35 years. In this 
context, sanctions can and should become an 
incentive for the country to move onto the rails 
of sovereign socio-economic development, to 
create an economically and politically 
independent Russia, to ensure Russia’s national 
security. 
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